Title II of the Omnibus Crime Bill: A Study of the Interaction of Law and Politics by Stephan, Kenneth
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 48 | Issue 1 Article 8
1968
Title II of the Omnibus Crime Bill: A Study of the
Interaction of Law and Politics
Kenneth Stephan
University of Nebraska College of Law, kenneth.stephan@nebraska.gov
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Kenneth Stephan, Title II of the Omnibus Crime Bill: A Study of the Interaction of Law and Politics, 48 Neb. L. Rev. 193 (1969)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol48/iss1/8
Comment
TITLE II OF THE OMNIBUS CRIME BILL:
A STUDY OF
THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND POLITICS
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to a nation-wide increase in the occurrence of violent
crime accompanied by public demands for more efficient law en-
forcement and the recommendations of the President's Commission
on law enforcement and criminal justice, Congress has recently
enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.1
This bill provides for allocation of federal funds to assist state and
local enforcement units in improving their facilities and training
new and existing personnel. It also deals with a wide variety of
specific law enforcement problems, including standards for use of
electronic surveillance equipment, control of firearms, riot control,
and search and seizure requirements. Perhaps the most contro-
versial portion of the act, however, is Title II, which amends Title
18 of the United States Code by defining new standards for admis-
sion of confessions and eyewitness testimony in the federal courts.
This section was added to the Omnibus Crime Bill by the Senate
after House passage.2 It was prompted by widespread criticism
of recent Supreme Court decisions which allegedly "hamstring"
police and "mollycoddle" criminal offenders 3
This article will be limited to an analysis of the new standards
for admissibility of confessions in federal courts which were pro-
mulgated in Title TT of the Omnibus Crime Bill and are now em-
bodied in 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (hereinafter referred to as § 3501).4 This
article will first examine the specific provisions of Title II with
1 Pub. Law 90-351 (1968).
2 The original version of Title I[ was embodied in S. 674, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1967). It was later incorporated into the Senate version of
the Omnibus C~ime Bill; S. 917, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1967). The
House version of the bill, H.R. 5037, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), con-
tained none of the Title II provisions.
s Criticism of the Supreme Court has been aimed primarily at the deci-
sions in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964);
and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
4 No attempt will be made in this article to analyze the portion of Title
II dealing with eye witness testimony and its effect on the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). How-
ever, many of the constitutional problems discussed with respect to
the effect of Title II on the Miranda decision will be applicable with
respect to Wade. For an analysis of the Wade decision, see, Comment,
The Right to Counsel During Pre-trial Identification Proceedings-
An Examination, 47 NEB. L. REv. 740 (1968).
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respect to factual content and also with respect to the effect of the
legislation on the Supreme Court's decisions in Miranda v. Ari-
zona,5 Mallory v. United States," and McNabb v. United States.7
In speculating as to the validity of Title II, emphasis will center
upon the question of whether the authority to impose finality on an
interpretation of the Constitution rests with the legislative or
judicial branch of the federal government. It is suggested that
those sections of Title II which modify Miranda with respect to
the necessity of specific procedural safeguards to insure voluntari-
ness of a confession are an unconstitutional invasion of the judicial
branch by Congress, substituting legislative interpretation of the
fifth amendment for that of the Supreme Court. However, those
sections which modify the Mallory and McNabb doctrines, concern-
ing the effect of unreasonable pre-arraignment delay on an other-
wise voluntary confession, are within the scope of legislative action
since the decisions are not based on constitutional principles but are
rather interpretations of Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.8 With this premise in mind, the final portions of this
article will deal with the various courses of action which Congress
could have taken as an alternative to enactment of Title II, as well
as an analysis of the specific factors that influenced Congress in
taking the action that it did.
IL TITLE II-ITS CONTENT AND EFFECT
The portion of Title II dealing with admissibility of confessions
is arranged in four major subdivisions. The first of these9 is a
reiteration of the Supreme Court's 1964 holding in Jackson v.
Denno,10 providing that a defendant's confession is admissible in
evidence if voluntarily given, and that the determination of volun-
tariness is to be made by the trial judge in a preliminary hearing
out of the presence of the jury. The effect of this section is to estab-
lish the voluntariness of a confession as the sole prerequisite for its
admissibility and to insure a determination of voluntariness which
is totally divorced from any considerations of guilt or innocence.
5 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
7 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
8 FED. R. CImm. P. 5 (a).
9 18U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1968).
10 378 U.S. 368 (1964). This case held that a defendant in a state court
was entitled to a state court hearing on the issue of voluntariness of
his confession by a body other than the one trying his guilt or inno-
cence. Title II extends this right to defendants in federal courts. The
rationale behind the separate adjudication of voluntariness is that this
issue should be decided on its own merits, uninfluenced by the truth
or falsity of the confession itself. Id. at 376-77. The Court here found
that the separate adjudication of voluntariness is a constitutional right.
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The second section1 is an enumeration of the various factors
which are to enter into the determination of voluntariness. These
factors are basically those which have been established by the
Supreme Court in the Mallory and Miranda decisions. They in-
clude: (1) the amount of time elapsing between arrest and arraign-
ment, if the confession is actually obtained during that interval;
(2) whether the defendant knew or was informed of the nature of
the charges which were being brought against him; (3) whether the
defendant knew or was advised of his right to remain silent and
whether he was aware of the consequences of any statement made
by him; (4) whether the defendant knew or was informed of his
right to counsel prior to questioning; and (5) whether in fact the
defendant had the assistance of counsel at the time that the con-
fession was obtained.
Having announced the criteria to be used in the court's de-
termination, the section concludes:
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors
to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive
on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.12
Thus, according to the wording of this section, it is now possible
for a confession to be adjudged voluntary and admissible in the
federal courts even though the officers obtaining the confession
did not afford the defendant all of the procedural safeguards which
were held to be constitutional requirements in Miranda v. Arizona.3
The determination of voluntariness of a confession in the federal
courts is left entirely to the discretion of the trial judge under the
provisions of Title II.
The third subdivision of Title II4 deals with delay between the
arrest and arraignment of the accused and its effect on the admissi-
bility of a confession obtained before arraignment. The section pro-
vides that such a delay will not automatically render involuntary
a confession obtained during the interval if the trial judge is suffi-
ciently convinced of the voluntariness of the confession and if it is
obtained within six hours after the arrest or detention. This maxi-
mum time limit is circumvented by a clause which provides that
11 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (1968).
12 Id. (emphasis added).
13 384 U.S. 436 (1966). It should be noted that although the Miranda
case was tried in the state courts and reached the Supreme Court on
a writ of certiorari, the holding that was announced was of consti-
tutional dimension in that it interpreted the fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination. Therefore, the Miranda warnings are
required in federal as well as in state court proceedings.
14 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (1968).
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the limitation does not apply in any case where the judge finds
the additional delay to be reasonable "... . considering the means of
transportation and the distance to be traveled.... ,,'r
The effect of this section is that even if a delay of four or five
hours is unwarranted by the circumstances a confession obtained
during that delay will not be held inadmissible if the trial court
determines that it was voluntary. This is a departure from the
McNabb-Mallory rule which states that any confession obtained
during a period of unreasonable delay between arrest and arraign-
ment will be held inadmissible.16
The final section 17 concerns standards for determining the ad-
missibility of a spontaneous confession made without warning to
police officers before the person making the confession can be in-
formed of his constitutional rights. The section simply states that
nothing contained in Title II will bar the admissibility of a con-
fession made by someone not under detention or interrogation, as
long as that confession is voluntarily made. Once again, the ulti-
mate determination of voluntariness for the purpose of submission
as evidence is left to the discretion of the trial judge.
It is apparent that the several sections of Title II dealing with
admissibility of confessions attempt to re-establish the discretion
of the trial judge as the sole basis for a determination of volun-
tariness. The statute seeks to eliminate the court-made prerequisites
for a determination of voluntariness which were established in
Miranda, Mallory, and McNabb, thus making the determination
of voluntariness a subjective decision.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CASE LAW PRIOR TO TITLE II
Voluntariness has always been the sole standard for determining
the admissibility of a confession, and this has not been changed
by either Miranda or Title II. Congress and the Supreme Court
have disagreed, however, over the question of what criteria are
to be applied in deciding whether a confession was the product of
the defendant's free will.
15 Idb
16 This rule is a product of the Supreme Court decisions in Mallory v.
United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), and McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943). These decisions interpreted Rule 5(a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which makes mandatory the
prompt appearance of an arrest suspect before a commissioner in
order to determine whether the evidence supports further detention.
The McNabb-Mallory rule was intended to eliminate prolonged and
unnecessary detention prior to arraignment for no other purpose other
than to obtain a confession.
17 18 U.S.C. § 3501(d) (1968).
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A. Miranda v. Arizona-ITs EFFECT ON THE "TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES" TEST.
Prior to the decision in Miranda, the question of voluntariness
was resolved through the use of the "totality of the circumstances"
test, which required the trial judge to consider as criteria for his
determination of voluntariness all of the circumstances surround-
ing the confession, including the mental and emotional condition
of the defendant and the procedures utilized by the police. On the
basis of his findings, the trial judge would determine whether the
confession was voluntary and therefore admissible. 8
The "totality of the circumstances" test is attractive in theory.
One immediately draws the image of the fair-minded judge care-
fully balancing all of the relevant facts on the scales and meting
out justice accordingly. It was argued that the only way in which
voluntariness could be a workable standard for the admissibility of
confessions was by an analysis of each case on its facts. In practice,
however, this test often brought alarmingly unjust results. In
1936, a Mississippi court found voluntary and admissible the con-
fession of several young Negroes who were brought into a house
full of white men and tortured until they confessed to a murder. 9
The marks of a rope were still visible on the neck of one of the
defendants at the trial. In fllinois, a woman was told to "co-
operate" with the interrogating officer or her children would be
taken from her. The trial court, examining the "totality of the
circumstances," found her confession to be admissible as a product
of her free will.20 And as recently as 1966, the United States
Supreme Court overruled a North Carolina decision which admitted
into evidence the confession obtained from an uneducated Negro
who was held incommunicado in a tiny cell for two weeks after his
arrest, fed two dry sandwiches per day, and questioned until he
confessed. 21 In short, the defect of the "totality of the circumstances"
18 Cases following the "totality of the circumstances" test include:
Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S.
55 (1951); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941). For a discussion
of the defects in the "totality of the circumstances" test, see, Kamisar,
A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents; Some Comments on the "New"
Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 Mc. L. Rsv.
59 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Kamisar].
19 Brown v. Mississippi, 173 liss. 542, 158 So. 339 (1935), rev'd 297 U.S.
278 (1936).
20 Lynumn v. Illinois, 21 I1.2d 63, 171 N.E.2d 17 (1961), rev'd, 372 U.S.
528 (1963).
21 Davis v. North Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 494 (E.D. N.C. 1963), aLFd, 339
F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1964), rev'd and remanded, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
Although the decision in this case was handed down by the Supreme
Court seven days after the Miranda decision, the Court did not apply
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test was that it was nearly impossible for an accused person to bear
the burden of proof in showing that his confession was coerced,
especially where the prosecution produced other evidence indicat-
ing guilt.22
The trend away from the "totality of the circumstances" test
began with the Supreme Court's decision in Haynes v. Washington2 3
decided in 1963. In that case, the Supreme Court examined the evi-
dence concerning alleged coercion in the obtaining of the confession
and found the allegations to be justified; which therefore resulted
in a reversal of the lower court's decision. The jury in Haynes was
instructed to preclude from its determination of voluntariness the
fact that the accused was not reminded that he was under arrest
and had an absolute right to remain silent, or that he had a right to
obtain counsel prior to questioning. While the Court did not find
these omissions to constitute a separate ground for reversal, it stated
that the failure to warn the defendant of these rights raised a "seri-
ous and substantial question whether a proper constitutional stand-
ard was applied by the jury., 24
The trend continued in Escobedo v. Illinois, 25 decided in 1964.
Here the defendant had asked for an attorney prior to questioning
by police. His request was refused. He was not informed of his
right to remain silent. The Supreme Court invalidated the confes-
sion, saying that the failure of the police to honor the accused's
request for counsel after the investigation had focused upon him
was contrary to the rights guaranteed by the sixth amendment and
by the fourteenth amendment due process clause, and was therefore
ground for reversal.
The final step in the departure from the "totality of the circum-
stances" test was taken in Miranda v. Arizona.26 The Supreme Court
in Miranda required the prosecution to meet the burden of proving
voluntariness of the confession as well as proving guilt. In order
the Miranda criteria to the confession since the trial was held prior
to Miranda; Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), decided on
the same day at Davis, held that Miranda could not be given a retro-
active effect. Therefore, the Supreme Court used the old "totality of
the circumstances" test to invalidate the confession in Davis.
22 Kamisar, supra note 18, at 62.
23 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
24 Id. at 518.
25 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The interpretation of Escobedo in other states
was extremely inconsistent, resulting in confusion as to exactly what
the decision required with respect to warning the defendant of his
rights. The holding in Miranda could be interpreted as a clarification
of Escobedo.
26 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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to meet this burden, the prosecution is required to show that the
arresting officers have acquainted the defendant with his constitu-
tional rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel
before any confession was sought or obtained.27 Omission of any
one of the warnings according to the Court would result in the in-
admissibility of the confession. The Court stated:
The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system
of constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate
warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will
not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the individual was
aware of his rights without warning being given. Assessments of
the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on information as to
his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities,
can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clear-cut fact.28
In the two years of its existence, Miranda has been interpreted
very restrictively by the federal courts. The requirement of the
Miranda warnings as prerequisites for admissibility of a confession
has been limited strictly to cases of custodial interrogation; i.e.,
instances in which the defendant has been arrested or substantially
detained and subjected to formal interrogation by police officers.29
By providing in Title II that omission of any one of the Miranda
warnings will no longer make a confession involuntary per se, Con-
gress has revived the "totality of the circumstances" test in the
federal courts. Once again, the defendant must prove to the satis-
faction of the trial judge that his confession was coerced, and once
again, the ultimate decision as to voluntariness is vested in the dis-
cretion of the judge.
B. TNE McNabb-Mallory RuLE-ExcLusioN OF CONFESSIONS OBTAINE_
DTUJ G UNREASONABLE PRE-ARWAGWMENT DELAY.
The third subsection of Title II is a legislative modification of
the Supreme Court's decisions in Mallory v. United States and
McNabb v. United States.31 The holdings in these cases, often re-
27 Id. at 444.
28 Id. at 468.
29 The following cases are examples of the upholding of incriminating
statements made in response to questioning where the Miranda warn-
ings were not given: United States v. Agy, 374 F.2d 94 (6th Cir.
1967) (incriminating reply to question asked by alcohol tax agent
held admissible); Frohmann v. United States 380 F.2d 832 (8th Cir.
1967) (statement made to Internal Revenue agent making criminal
investigation held admissible); Mares v. United States, 383 F.2d 805
(10th Cir. 1967) (statement made to F.B.I. by suspect who was free
to leave held admissible).
30 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
31 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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ferred to together as the McNabb-Mallory rule, provide that any
confession obtained from a defendant during a period of unneces-
sary delay between arrest and arraignment is inadmissible in
evidence. This doctrine is predicated upon Rule 5 (a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2 which requires that an officer mak-
ing an arrest pursuant to an authorized warrant "... shall take the
arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest avail-
able commissioner ...,33 for the purpose of arraignment. It should
be noted that the McNabb-Mallory doctrine is not based on con-
stitutional grounds, but is simply a rule of evidence applicable to
the federal courts only. 4
The courts have been faced with determining in each case what
contitutes an "unnecessary delay." Once again, this has been done
by considering all of the facts relating to the arrest and detention
of the accused, such as the lateness of the hour35 or the legitimate
need for additional questioning before arraignment. 6 In short, there
is no single test to determine unnecessary delay, and the necessity
of the delay depends entirely upon the circumstances in each case. 7
Title II would modify the McNabb-Mallory rule to the extent
that no delay of less than six hours would be considered "unrea-
sonable" regardless of the circumstances and no confession obtained
during such a period would be inadmissible per se. In cases where
the delay was more than six hours, the trial judge could admit the
confession if he felt that it was voluntary and if he was convinced
that the factors causing the delay, such as transportation problems,
were reasonable. This section in the final version of Title II is less
harsh than the corresponding section in the original draft,3s which
stated that no confession would be inadmissible because of delay
as long as the judge believed that it was voluntary.
The authors of Title II seem to have missed the point with regard
to the policy basis for the McNabb-Mallory rule. In Mallory, the
Court is not so much concerned with the length of the delay, but
rather with the reason for the delay. Rule 5 (a) and the Mallory
holding were intended to insure a swift determination of whether
there was probable cause for the arrest of the defendant, and in
order to meet this requirement, it was necessary that there be
sufficient extrinsic evidence to justify the detention of the accused.
32 FED. R. Civ. P. 5 (a).
33 Id.
34 Allen v. Bannan, 332 F.2d 399 (6th Cir. 1964).
35 Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1960).
36 United States v. Ladson, 294 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1961).
37 United States v. Mihalopoulos, 228 F. Supp. 994 (D.D.C. 1964).
38 S. 917, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 701 (1967) [hereinafter cited as S. 917].
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This evidentiary requirement cannot be constitutionally met by an
extended pre-arraignment interrogation for the purpose of ex-
tracting a confession from the accused, followed by a subsequent
arraignment wherein the confession is used to justify the initial
arrest. As stated in Mallory:
Circumstances may justify a brief delay between arrest and ar-
raignment, as for instance, where the story volunteered by the
accused is susceptible of quick verification through third parties.
But the delay must not be of a nature to give opportunity for the
extraction of a confessions 9
The federal courts that have interpreted the McNabb-Malory
doctrine have generally made this distinction in determining the
reasonableness of the delay between arrest and arraignment. De-
lays of as long as one or more days have been upheld as reasonable,40
so long as the delay was prompted by unavoidable circumstances
and was not merely an attempt to extract a confession from a sus-
pect who could not be charged on the strength of existing evidence.
The provisions of Title H dealing with pre-arraignment interro-
gation would give law enforcement officers, who may have insuffi-
cient evidence to hold a suspect, at least a limited license to try to
obtain a confession before arraignment. It would appear that Con-
gress is in effect telling law enforcement officers investigating fed-
eral criminal cases that they may arrest on insufficient evidence and
take up to six hours to augment that evidence by obtaining a "'vol-
untary confession," even if the accused could have been brought
before a committing magistrate within thirty minutes of his arrest.
The importance of obtaining a confession from a suspect is evidently
deemed paramount to the importance of insuring that such a con-
fession is truly the product of the defendant's free will.41
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
The modification or reversal of a Supreme Court decision
89 354 U.S. 449, 455 (1957) (emphasis added). See also, United States
v. Meachum, 197 F. Supp. 803 (D.D.C. 1961).
40 Pierce v. United States, 197 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
41 It should be noted here that the federal courts and federal law
enforcement agencies have had an extremely admirable record of
affording the criminal defendant all of his constitutional rights. In
the Miranda opinion, it was noted that the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation had warned suspects of their rights prior to any questioning
for a number of years. 384 U.S. 436, 483-86 (1966). It should not be
inferred that the passage of Title II lifting the Miranda requirements
will give rise to a large scale neglect of criminal defendants' rights
in the federal system. The point to be made is that the elimination of
the safeguards creates at least a remote possibility that a defendant's
constitutional rights might be abused in isolated cases. It is this remote
possibility that Miranda sought to prevent.
202 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 48, NO. 1 (1968)
through congressional legislation poses serious constitutional ques-
tions. An assessment of the constitutional validity of Title II must
be divided into two areas of analysis: (1) the constitutionality of
the sections which attempt to overrule the Miranda decision with
respect to the federal courts; and (2) the validity of legislative
modification of the holdings in McNabb and Mallory.
A. TITLE II AND Miranda-AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE
In analyzing the validity of Title II with respect to Miranda, it is
interesting to speculate as to what arguments the Supreme Court
might rely on in determining the constitutionality of the statute. In
addition, the considerations which Congress gave to the constitu-
tional question prior to enactment should be examined.
1. A Proposed Constitutional Attack
The criteria which Title II established for determining the volun-
tariness of a confession in the federal courts would be held uncon-
stitutional in the state courts under the Miranda decision.4 This
inconsistency is perplexing, since it is difficult to imagine how a
single constitution could require two different standards for pro-
tection of the privilege against self-incrimination, depending on
whether the prosecution was being brought in a state or federal
court. The constitutional issue, simply stated, is whether Congress
can ignore an interpretation of the Constitution made by the United
States Supreme Court reviewing a case on certiorari from the state
courts. It is suggested that the answer is an emphatic "no."
Without purporting to anticipate the exact reasoning that the
Supreme Court will use when the inevitable test case challenging
Title II arises, the argument against the constitutionality of the
legislation is so obvious as to seem simplistic. A federal statute
provides that the Supreme Court has the power to grant a writ of
certiorari to review a decision rendered by the highest court in a
state where ". . . any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially
set up or claimed under the Constitution .... ,,43 In other words, when
a defendant being prosecuted under a state criminal statute raises
as a defense the denial of a constitutional right, the United States
Supreme Court may review the ultimate decision of the state court
in order to determine the federal question.
Once the Supreme Court has reviewed a constitutional question
arising from a state criminal prosecution, its holding becomes a
42 Myers v. State, 3 Md. App. 534, 240 A.2d 288 (1968), holding that a
confession made while the defendant was in custody and was not
informed of his rights was involuntary.
43 U.S.C. § 1257 (1964).
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statement of what the Constitution requires and is therefore bind-
ing on all state and federal courts. This principle stems from the
decision in Marbury v. Madison," which established judicial review
of federal statutes in order to determine their constitutionality. In
reaching that decision, Chief Justice Marshall referred to the Con-
stitution as the "fundamental and paramount law of the nation,"
and declared: "It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is."45
Subsequent to the decision in Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme
Court determined in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee46 that it had the
power to review the constitutionality of a state court's decision
where a federal constitutional question was involved. These two
cases have been accepted as a definitive statement of the Supreme
Court's power to make constitutional adjudications which become
the supreme law of the land47 and are binding on all branches of
state and federal government.
The problem with regard to the constitutionality of Title II is
whether the Supreme Court's interpretation of the requirements
of the fifth amendment in Miranda is to be given the same effect as
an express provision of the Constitution; that is, does it become
the supreme law of the land? In 1958, the Supreme Court decided
Cooper v. Aaron,48 which reaffirmed the Brown school desegrega-
tion case49 and ordered recalcitrant state officials to comply with
that decision as a constitutional mandate. Using strong language,
the Court in Cooper emphasized the fact that the decision in Brown
was a statement of constitutional requirements and declared that
"the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution.... ."50 The state officials were ordered to comply with
the Brown ruling so as to fulfill their oaths to support the Con-
stitution.51
As these cases indicate, constitutional interpretations by the
Supreme Court have often been attacked by critics as "judicial legis-
lation." The propriety and necessity of such interpretation has long
been upheld by distinguished jurists and legal scholars. Charles
Evans Hughes wrote: "We are under a Constitution-but the Con-
44 5 u.s. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
45 Id. at 176.
46 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304 (1816).
47 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
48 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
49 Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
50 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
51 Id.
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stitution is what the judges say it is."'52 Mr. Justice Jackson ana-
lyzed the role of the judiciary in a similar fashion:
The real strength of the position of the Court is probably in its
indispensibility to government under a written Constitution. It is
difficult to see how the provisions of a one-hundred-and-fifty-year-
old written document can have much vitality if there is not some
permanent institution to translate them into current commands. 53
It is thus evident that if the Constitution is to serve as a viable
legal instrument, its broad provisions will require interpretation
and application to specific situations. These interpretations must
be given the same legal efficacy as if they were explicitly included
in the Constitution itself.
When the Miranda decision was handed down in 1966, the Court's
holding was based on an interpretation of the fifth amendment,54
which has been made applicable to the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.55 It should be made
clear, therefore, that although the decision was aimed primarily
at the state courts, the basis for the decision was the fifth amend-
ment of the Constitution and it is therefore binding on the federal
courts as well. When the Supreme Court enumerates specific safe-
guards that are constitutionally guaranteed to the criminal defend-
ant in a state prosecution by the fourteenth amendment, it follows
a fortiori that these same requirements are constitutionally essential
in federal prosecutions.
The Court in Miranda made every effort to emphasize that its
holding was an interpretation of the Constitution, and as such
could not be disturbed by legislative flat. The Court invited Con-
gress and the state legislatures to develop their own safeguards
to insure the voluntariness of confessions, but it stated that the
safeguards must be ". . fully as effective as those described. . ." in
the decision (i.e., the Miranda warnings)."6 The Court continued:
In any event, however, the issues presented are of constitutional
dimensions and must be determined by the courts .... Judicial solu-
tions to problems of constitutional dimension have evolved decade
by decade.... Where rights secured by the Constitution are in-
volved, there can be no rule-making or legislation which would
abrogate them.57
52 Addresses and Papers of Charles Evans Hughes 139-40 (1908).
53 R. JACKSON, THE SUPREvE COURT AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF Gov-
ERNMENT 26 (1965).
384 U.S. at 467-73.
55 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1963).
56 384 U.S. at 467.
57 Id. at 490 (emphasis added).
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It would seem that the Court's mandate could not be stated
more explicitly. In short, the aforementioned sections of Title H
would appear to be unconstitutional on their face.
2. Congressional Consideration of Constitutionality Prior to Pas-
sage-A Specter of Doubt
The issue of constitutionality was not ignored by the authors of
Title II, but their arguments supporting it are not very convincing.
In the final report of the Senate Judiciary Committee on the
Omnibus Crime Control Act, Senator McClellan expresses the view
that the new confession standards proposed in Title H are valid
as a legitimate exercise of the power of Congress to prescribe the
formulation of rules of procedure for the federal courts."' In answer
to critics who maintained that Title II could not be constitutionally
reconciled with Miranda, Senator McClellan states that the vast
majority of persons who testified before the committee were in
favor of Title II and expressed no doubts as to its constitutionality
if passed.59 Also, McClellan states that the dissenting opinions in
Miranda expressed the view that enactments such as Title HI
would be constitutional.60 Senator McClellan concluded:" The com-
mittee feels that by the time the issue of constitutionality would
reach the Supreme Court, the probability rather is that this legisla-
tion would be upheld."6 1
This confidence was not shared by all the members of the com-
mittee. Senator Sam Ervin, one of the co-sponsors of the bill,
58 S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as S. REP. No. 1097].
59 Id. at 52. It should be noted that the majority of the witnesses that
were called to testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee's hear-
ings on the proposed bills which were incorporated into Title II were
chiefs of police, district attorneys, and other "prosecution oriented"
persons. A great many of them were not actually qualified to make
a rational prediction or analysis of the constitutionality of the bill,
and the opinions which Senator McClellan seems to place so much
emphasis on were largely speculative rather than authoritative.
60 Id. Senator McClellan is referring specifically to the dissenting opinion
of Justices Harlan, Stewart, and White. Again, this argument in sup-
port of constitutionality seems to have little weight. While it is sig-
nificant that four Justices dissented in Miranda, it does not logically
follow that this minority view should be argued as authority for the
view that legislation reversing Miranda would be constitutional.
61 Id. at 51. This sentence would seem to provide the key to the question
of why Congress would pass a bill that appears to have blatant con-
stitutional defects. It is possible that Congress was trying to force
the Supreme Court to re-examine its holding in Miranda and pos-
sibly reverse itself. This proposition will be discussed more fully in
a later section of this article.
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testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee, expressed the
following reservations:
Although I favor the substance of S. 674 [which was incorporated
into the Omnibus Crime Bill as Title II-Admissibility of Con-
fessions] and strongly feel it is preferable to the present situation,
I do not believe the problem can be rectified by such a simple
legislative enactment. It is true that the Miranda opinion invites
legislative action on the subject of police interrogation practices.
However, the restrictions set forth in that decision and the Esco-
bedo decision are said to be required by the Constitution, and
hence any legislative enactment might be deemed by the Supreme
Court to be unconstitutional to the extent that it failed to embody
rules of police conduct at least as restrictive as those in the Miranda
and Escobedo decisions. 62
Senator Ervin's fears are echoed in a minority report submitted
by Senators Tydings, Dodd, Hart, Long, Kennedy, Burdick, and
Fong, which was included in the final Senate Judiciary Committee
report on the Omnibus Crime Control Act . 3 This report expresses
the opinion that although Congress has the authority under the
Constitution to enact rules of criminal procedure, including rules
governing the admissibility of confessions, there is nothing in the
Constitution which gives Congress the power to formulate rules
which override Supreme Court decisions interpreting the funda-
mental requirements of the Constitution. As stated in the minority
report: "Congress has the power only to expand, not to contract
or abrogate these basic guarantees. ' 64
It becomes apparent, therefore, that Congress enacted Title II
in spite of strong expressions of doubt concerning the constitu-
tionality of the bill. The doubt came not only from the opponents
of the bill, but even from some of its chief proponents. Further-
more, no viable arguments were offered in support of constitu-
tionality. These facts will certainly be taken into consideration if
the Supreme Court is called upon to review Title II, and it would
appear that they militate strongly toward a finding of unconstitu-
tionality.
62 Hearings on S. 674 (et. al.) Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws
and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 4 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 674]. Senator
Ervin proposed an alternative bill which would have precluded the
federal courts from reviewing a ruling of a state trial court which
admitted a confession into evidence if that ruling had been reviewed
by the highest state court. This bill was later incorporated into Title
II, but was deleted from the final version.
63 S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 58, at 147.
64 Id. at 150.
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B. MoDmcATioN OF McNabb-Mallory-A VALID ExERciSE OF CON-
GrESIONAL PoWER.
Title II, insofar as it modifies the McNabb-Mallory rule, seems
to stand on solid constitutional ground. The McNabb and Mallory
holdings were not based on constitutional principles, but rather
they were an interpretation of Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.65 Since the power of the Supreme Court to
formulate these rules is derived from Congress, a Congressional
modification of one of the rules is not an unconstitutional usurpa-
tion of the Court.66
Congressional discontent with the Mallory decision is not a
recent development. In 1958, a bill was introduced in the House of
Representatives which would have provided that no evidence,
including confessions, would be inadmissable solely because of
delay in bringing in the arrested person before a Commissioner.67
After passage by the House, the Senate Judiciary Committee
amended the bill by inserting the word "reasonable" before "delay,".
and Senate passage ensued. In a House-Senate conference com-
mittee, however, there was an objection to the Senate amendment,
and a compromise provision was added which would have required
that any delay in arraignment should be a factor in determining vol-
untariness of a confession. At the hearing before final passage,.
however, a point of order was raised and sustained, so that final
passage was averted.68
It is interesting to note that the Congressional opponents of this:
bill were not so much opposed to its content as to its anti-Court.
sentiment. As Senator Jacob Javits of New York said:
Were I not convinced.., that this is but the first bill dealing with
dissatisfaction with a decision of the Supreme Court, and if I did
not realize that the record made in connection with this measure
will be a great indication to the country, as well as to our col-
leagues, of how we think about the entire problem raised by various
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, I would not make
this presentation against the bill .... 69
Thus, there is the beginning of a feeling of uncertainty as to,
what are the proper and legal responses that Congress may make-
to certain decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting the Consti-
65 Ferganchick v. United States, 374 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1967); Palakiko,
v. Harper, 209 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1953).
66 This power is pursuant to an enabling act entitled Criminal Pleading
and Trial Rules Act of 1940, ch. 445, 54 Stat. 688.
67 H.R. 11477, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
68 104 CONG. REc. 19575-76 (1958).
69 Id. at 18489.
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tution. It is this question of proper Congressional response that
becomes the issue of long-range importance.
V. ALTERNATIVE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSES-
THE ROADS NOT TAKEN
Assuming that Title II, insofar as it modifies Miranda, is uncon-
stitutional, it is instructive to look at some of the alternative ap-
proaches that Congress could have taken without encountering
constitutional difficulties. For purposes of analysis, the acceptable
modes of response shall be divided into three classifications: (1)
influence over appointment of personnel; (2) a limitation of the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review lower court findings of
voluntariness of confessions; and finally, (3) proposal of a Con-
stitutional amendment which would reverse the Miranda holding.
Each of these modes of response will be analyzed with respect to
their historical development as well as to their effectiveness as
a legislative tool.
A. INFLUENCE OVER APpOnT1VMNT OF COURT PERSONNEL
It is within the delegated constitutional powers of Congress to
exercise some authority in deciding who shall sit on the Supreme
Court. This function is accomplished through the "advice and
consent" procedure in the Senate in approving new appointments
by the President," through control over the number of justices
that shall sit on the Court,71 and through the initiation of the seldom
used impeachment and removal procedures.7 2 While these seem
like rather unsophisticated and mechanical maneuvers, their effec-
tiveness should not be underestimated. For instance, a series of
liberal Court decisions decided by a 5-4 majority of the Court
followed by a vacancy on the bench and Congressional pressure
for appointment of a conservative replacement, could bring about
a decided change in the general tenor of the Court. The effective-
ness of this sort of procedure, however, depends greatly on the for-
tuity of circumstance, and it is not an effective means to achieve
an immediate alteration in the specific effects of any particular
decision.
70 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
71 Although the power to determine the number of Supreme Courtjustices is not specifically delegated to Congress, it can perform this
function on the recommendation of the President, pursuant to Article
II, sec. 3 of the Constitution. This rationale was the basis of the pro-
posed court-packing legislation of 1937. See, The President's Mes-
sage of February 5, 1937 in Regard to the Federal Judiciary, 22 MAss.
L. Q. 6 (1937).
72 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 3.
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Throughout the history of the Supreme Court there have been
several examples of Congressional manipulation of Court personnel
in response to a controversy between the legislative and judicial
branches. In 1865 and 1867, Congress refused to approve appoint-
ments to fill two Supreme Court vacancies, since the two justices
who had died had been in disagreement with the dominant view of
Congress in several key areas, and Congress feared that any new
appointees would follow the same policies.7" Congress intentionally
stalled the appointments made by President Andrew Johnson until
after the election of President Grant in 1867, at which time new
appointments were made that won the full support and approval
of Congress.74 This sort of "reverse court packing" is an effective
tool when Congress feels that its dominant views represent the
majority view in the country. If this is the case, Congress can
resist any new appointments and wait for the next Presidential
election with hopes that a new President will appoint Justices whose
views are compatible with Congressional policies.75
It is very likely that the Senate is now engaged in "reverse
court packing" with its hesitance to affirm the President's recent
appointments to the Supreme Court.76 There is a strong possibility
that the opposition to the so-called "lame duck" appointments,
headed by the conservative Southern Democratic bloc as well as
many Republicans, may be an attempt to forestall any appointments
to the Court until after a new President is elected, since this would
increase the chance that a more conservative appointee would be
named. Indeed, many of the Senate supporters of Title HI are the
leaders of the movement to block the current Supreme Court
appointments, while those that were opposed to the passage of
Title II are generally in favor of Senate approval of the appoint-
ments.77 The alignment of anti-Court sentiment is very clearly
73 The vacancies were left by the deaths of Justices Catron and Wayne,
who had been in disagreement with the Radical Republican views
regarding Civil War reconstruction. See generally, Comment, Con-
gress v. Court: The Legislative Arsenal, 10 VmL. L. REv. 347, 351-52
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Congress v. Court].
74 William Strong and Joseph Bradley were appointed to the Court byPresident Grant in 1870.
75 Congress v. Court, supra note 73, at 352.
76 Associate Justice Abe Fortas has been nominated to fill the vacancy
left by Chief Justice Warren's retirement; Judge Homer Thornberry
was nominated to become Associate Justice. On October 2, 1968, sub-
sequent to the writing of this article, Mr. Justice Fortas asked that his
nomination be withdrawn in response to strong Senate opposition
to his appointment.
77 Among those opposing the appointment are Senators Ervin, Eastland,
McClellan, and Thurmond, all of whom favored passage of Title II.
Those who favor the appointments include Senators Hart, Kennedy,
Tydings, and Burdick, all of whom were opposed to passage of Title IL
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defined in the Senate, with opponents of the Court exerting con-
siderable influence.
Other methods of controlling personnel have been used by
Congress to a limited extent. The number of Justices that com-
prise the Court has been changed by Congress several times.7 8
The most recent attempt to reform the Court through numerical
alteration was the notorious and tnsuccessful "court-packing"
experiment in 1936. After several Supreme Court decisions were
handed down declaring various New Deal legislation unconstitu-
tional,79 a bill supported by President Roosevelt was introduced
in Congress which would have increased the number of Justices
from nine to fifteen,80 thus enabling the President to appoint liberal
Justices to fill the new positions and insure a Court that would be
sympathetic to liberal legislation. Popular sentiment ran high
against this somewhat underhanded technique, however, and the
bill was defeated in Congress.
The use of the impeachment power has been used only once with
regard to a Supreme Court Justice, and that attempt was unsuc-
cessful in obtaining a conviction and removal. In 1803, the House
brought impeachment proceedings against Justice Samuel Chase,
but he was acquitted of the general charges brought against him.
The entire procedure was an attempt by the Jeffersonian Congress
to remove the Federalist influence in the Supreme Court.8 ' Perhaps
one of the reasons for the extremely limited use of the impeach-
ment procedure is the fact that the Constitution sets standards for
impeachment and removal which are extremely difficult to meet.
The basis for removal of any federal judge is restricted to "high
crimes and misdemeanors,"8 2 and two-thirds of the Senate must
concur in any removal decision.8
78 The last time Congress changed the number of Supreme Court Justices
was in 1869, when the Court membership was increased from eight
to nine.
79 An example is United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1935), which held
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 unconstitutional.
80 Draft Bill, 22 MASS. L.Q. 16 (1937). The bill ostensibly would have
provided for the retirement of older Justices and appointment of
new Justices to help the older men keep up with their workload;
however, it was evident that the real purpose was to allow the Presi-
dent to appoint a Court majority sympathetic to his views.
81 See generally, C. PITCHETT, CONGaRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT
6 (1961).
92 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
83 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
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B. CoNGREssIoNAL RESPONSE THROUGH LIMITATION OF JUIISDICTION
1. Basis and Development
A second recognized method of Congressional regulation of the
Supreme Court is through a limitation of the Court's appellate
jurisdiction. The power to define the perimeters of the jurisdiction
of federal courts is granted to Congress by the Constitution." There
has been much written concerning exactly how far this Congres-
sional power extends and what results could conceivably ensue from
its unrestricted exercise, but a detailed analysis of these theoretical
problems will not be attempted here. 5
Congress has succeeded only once in bluntly attacking the
Court's views on a particular issue through a limitation of appel-
late jurisdiction. In Ex Parte McCardle,6 the Supreme Court re-
fused to hear a case brought up on a habeas corpus petition after
Congress had repealed the part of the Judiciary Act of 1867, thereby
removing the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over habeas
corpus actions.8 7 The Court in McCardle thus acnkowledged the
express power of Congress to strip it of certain portions of its
appellate jurisdiction. In the words of Chief Justice Chase:
We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature.
We can only examine into its power under the Constitution; and
the power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this
court is given by express words.88
The partial repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1867 which led to
the decision in McCardle was obviously a political maneuver by
Congress. At the end of the Civil War, a disagreement existed
between the majority in Congress and the majority of the Justices
of the Supreme Court concerning what course to take in bringing
about Reconstruction. The Radical Republicans in Congress, who
had initiated the "reverse court packing" tactics mentioned earlier,
did not want to see the McCardle case brought before the Supreme
Court because they feared that the Reconstruction Acts, under
which McCardle was convicted, would be found unconstitutional. To
prevent this, the repeal measure was tacked on to a revenue bill
and passed over the President's veto, due to the strength of the Radi-
84 U.S. CONsT. art. In, § 2.
85 For discussions of the extent of Congress' power to limit Supreme
Court jurisdiction, see Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Juris-
diction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Hv. L. REV.
1362 (1953); and Martig, Congress and the Appellate Jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, 34 icH. L. REV. 650 (1936).
86 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 506 (1868).
87 14 Stat. 385 (1867).
88 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 506, 514 (1868).
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cal Republicans in Congress. Thus, the legislation which resulted in
McCardle was a successful attempt by Congress to prevent the
Supreme Court from interfering with its policies s 9
Congressional limitation of Supreme Court appellate jurisdic-
tion has been attempted in recent years. Between 1955 and 1958,
the Supreme Court handed down a series of decisions aimed at
insuring the individual's rights in any congressional, state, or private
investigation the purpose of which was to uncover "subversive
activities" and to expose those involved in such activities 0 These
investigations had often become nothing more than witchhunts,
and the basic rights of individuals with regard to the privilege
against self-incrimination and freedom of speech were often ig-
nored.91 This vindication of individual rights by the Court brought
a sharp reaction from Congress, since many members felt that the
investigative functions of Congress and the states were being
usurped by the Court under the guise of protecting individual
rights.9 2 In order to rectify the situation a bill was introduced in
the Senate which would have removed the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in reviewing actions of investigating bodies whose
89 The partial repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1867 which took away the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction over habeas corpus actions was passed
immediately before the McCardle case reached the appellate level.
The purpose of Congress was obviously to keep the case from reach-
ing the Supreme Court. The Radical Republicans in Congress did not
want their legislation to be reviewed by a politically hostile Court.
See, supra note 73 and corresponding text.
90 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298 (1957); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957);
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); Slochower v. Board of
Higher Education of New York City, 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
91 For example, the Watkins case invalidated a conviction of a witness
before the House Un-American Activities Committee who had refused
to answer questions relating to his knowledge of Communist Party
members and their identity because he could see no pertinence to the
purpose of Congress. The Court said: "The Bill of Rights is applicable
to investigations as to all forms of governmental action." 354 U.S.
178, 188 (1957).
92 Senator Jenner, in introducing S. 2646 aimed at limiting the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction over internal security matters, stated
that the purpose of the bill was to prevent the Supreme Court from
"stepping in and making new rules to the detriment of the security
of our country." Hearings on S. 2646 Before the Subcomm. to Investi-
gate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other
Internal Security Laws of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th
Cong. 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 39 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on
S. 2646].
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purpose was to insure internal security 3 This immunity fromjudicial review would have been extended to the investigative
functions of Congress, the Executive branch, state governments,
school boards, and bar associations. In the words of Senator Jenner,
who introduced the bill, its purpose was "to check judicial legisla-
tion in certain fields where it has been damaging the internal secur-
ity of the United States."94 The bill was supported by conservative
elements and opposed by the liberals. The Supreme Court in
1959 decided the Barenblatt case,95 retreating somewhat from its
earlier position in Watkins, and the bill was not passed.
(2) Present Efforts to Limit Jurisdiction
The use of Congressional regulatory power over Supreme Courtjurisdiction was not overlooked by the authors of Title II. Senator
Ervin introduced a proposal which would have removed review
of determinations of admissibility from the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.9 " This proposal was later incorporated into the
Senate version of the Omnibus Crime Control Act.9 7 The provision
read as follows:
Neither the Supreme Court nor any inferior court ordained and
established by Congress under Article I of the Constitution of the
United States shall have jfurisdiction to review or to reverse, vacate,
modify, or disturb in any way, a ruling of any trial court of any
State in any criminal prosecution admitting in evidence as volun-
tarily made an admission or confession of an accused if such ruling
has been affirmed or otherwise upheld by the highest court of the
State having appellate jurisdiction of the cause.98
Although this provision met with the approval of the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee, it was deleted from Title II of the Omnibus Crime
Control Act before final passage. 99
93 S. 2646, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1957).
94 Hearings on S. 2646, supra note 92, at 38.
95 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). In this case, the
Court held that investigation of communist activities was a valid
legislative purpose, and therefore all questioning directed to that
purpose was pertinent. The Barenblatt case is a good example of
the effective use of Congressional pressure on the Supreme Court. It
is possible that by enacting Title 31, Congress hopes to cause the
Supreme Court to make at least a partial retreat from its position
in Miranda in order to quiet Congressional criticism.
96 Hearings on S. 674, supra note 62, at 5.
97 S. 917, supra note 38.
98 S. 917, supra note 38, at § 701.
99 This provision was deleted during the House-Senate conferences on
Omnibus Crime Bill. No explanation can be found for its deletion.
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It is interesting to speculate as to the constitutionality of the
jurisdiction limitation if it had been retained in the final version
of Title II. The precedent of McCardle would seem to favor con-
stitutional validity at least in regard to the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, but there have been doubts expressed. In a sepa-
rate opinion included in the final Senate Judiciary Committee report
on the measure, 100 several Senators were highly critical of the
limitation on jurisdiction, expressing the view that its constitu-
tionality would not be upheld. They felt that the Constitution does
not empower Congress to remove the Supreme Court's jurisdic-
tion in all cases involving a particular issue, such as the admis-
sibility of confessions. Quoting from the opinion:
The exceptions and regulations clause does not give Congress the
power to abolish Supreme Court review in all cases involving a
particular issue.... To interpret the clause otherwise would deny
the long-accepted power of ultimate resolution of constitutional
questions by the Supreme Court.101
This line of reasoning would appear to be much more compatible
with the position that the Supreme Court has taken in recent
decisions with regard to its role as the final authority on adjudica-
tions of constitutional issues. It is questionable whether the Mc-
Cardle case, which is old and has not been reaffirmed, would be
a strong precedent in light of this argument.
C. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL AMaEND1IENT
1. Basis and Development
The one sure way to change the Supreme Court's interpretation
of a constitutional issue without running the risk of unconstitu-
tionality is through the amendment process. Congress may propose
constitutional amendments "whenever two-thirds of both Houses
shall deem it necessary.' 01 2 The proposed amendment must be
ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures or by a constitu-
tional convention in three-fourths of the states.0 3 On the application
of two-thirds of the state legislatures, Congress may call a consti-
tutional convention for the purpose of proposing amendments. 0 4
The process of amending the Constitution to reverse a decision
of the Supreme Court has been successfully used by Congress on
two occasions. The first of these was in 1798, when the eleventh
amendment was adopted in response to the Court's decision in
100 S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 58, at 155-57.
101 Id. at 156.
102 U.S. CONST., art. IV.
103 Id.
104 Id.
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Chisholm v. Georgia.0 5 The holding in this case would have made
it possible for a private citizen to sue a state other than his own in
the Supreme Court or in lower federal courts if the state con-
sented. Feeling that this decision presented a potentially danger-
ous situation, Congress in 1794 proposed to the state legislatures
an amendment to the Constitution which excluded from the judicial
power of the United States any suit "commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."'10 The amendment
was ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures and passed
into law in 1798.
The second constitutional amendment instigated by an unpopu-
lar decision of the Supreme Court was of far greater significance.
In 1895, the Court held in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Com-
pany10 7 that the Revenue Act of 1894 was unconstitutional and
void in that it imposed a direct tax on income from real estate and
personal property without apportioning the revenues to the var-
ious states on the basis of population. 08 Congress proposed the
sixteenth amendment which removed the requirement of appor-
tionment and enabled Congress to impose a direct tax on income
without apportioning the revenue. The amendment was ratified by
thirty-six of the state legislatures by the year 1913, indicating great
popular discontent with the Pollock decision.
At the present time there are several petitions being circulated
among the state legislatures for the purpose of gathering support
for proposal of several amendments to the Constitution. Among the
amendments being considered are three which are intended to
curb the Supreme Court: 0 9 (1) an amendment which would estab-
lish a supreme court of the states composed of the chief justices
of each of the fifty states, with authority to decide any case involv-
ing an alleged infringement of states' rights; (2) an amendment
which would remove the issue of state reapportionment from the
federal courts and from the equal protection guarantee of the
fourteenth amendment;" 0 and (3) an amendment which would
set up a new procedure for amending the Constitution, bypassing
Congress entirely by enabling two-thirds of the state legislatures
105 2 U.S. (2 Dall) 419 (1793).
106 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
107 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
1os Prior to the sixteenth amendment, apportionment of revenue from
direct federal taxes was required by U.S. CoNsT., art. I § 9.
109 See generally, Freund, The Supreme Court Under Attack, 25 U. P.r.
L. REv. 1 (1963).110 This amendment was proposed in response to Wesberry v. Sanders,
376 U.S. 1 (1964) and Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
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to propose an amendment and requiring three-fourths of the state
legislatures to ratify. These proposals will be submitted to Con-
gress if and when they are approved by two-thirds of the state
legislatures.
2. The Amending Process as a Possible Alternative to Title II
The possibility of enacting a constitutional amendment to re-
verse the holding in Miranda was not ignored by the supporters
of Title II. During the First Session of the Ninetieth Congress,
Senator Ervin proposed a resolution which would provide that all
voluntary confessions should be admissible in any court in the
United States, and that the determination of a trial judge as to the
voluntariness of the confession is final and cannot be reviewed by
any federal court, so long as the determination is supported by com-
petent evidence."' The language of this resolution is similar to that
of the subsequent bill proposed by Senator Ervin which would have
directly taken away the federal courts' jurisdiction to review
determinations of voluntariness made by a trial judge.. 2 Indeed,
the bill was proposed as an alternative to the amendment, since
Senator Ervin felt that it would provide a more direct route by
which Congress could alter the effects of the Miranda and Escobedo
decisions." 3
The chief objection to the uses of a constitutional amendment to
counteract the Miranda decision seems to have been the fact that
amending the Constitution is a difficult and time consuming process
which often takes four or five years to become effective. Also, since
ratification of the proposed amendment is within the province of
the state legislatures, Congress would have to assure itself of sup-
port in the states in order to insure final passage of the amendment.
Whatever the reason, Congress seems to have abandoned the amend-
ing process in favor of direct legislative modification of Miranda.
VI. UNDERLYING FACTORS RELATED TO PASSAGE OF
TITLE II-THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND POLITICS
It is not difficult to understand why Congress has taken the
unprecedented action of reversing the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the Constitution in Miranda through direct legislation,
rather than following the less questionable procedures of constitu-
tional amendment or limitation of jurisdiction. Throughout its
legislative history, Title II was backed by a highly influential bloc
M S.J. Res. 22, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
112 S. 917, supra note 38, at § 701.
113 Hearings on S. 674, supra note 62, at 5.
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of Senate conservatives, largely Southern, who have repeatedly
attacked the Supreme Court for its alleged encroachment upon
states' rights and its general role in an expanding federal govern-
ment. As previously shown, the supporters of Title II were largely
the same men who have introduced and supported anti-court legis-
lation in the past, and who have succeeded in preventing senate ap-
proval of two liberal appointees to the Supreme Court. It should not
be inferred, however, that Title II was the personal vendetta of a
few Senators who wished to strike a blow at the Court. An impres-
sive list of law enforcement officers, district attorneys, and judges
testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee, alleging the dele-
terious effects of the Miranda and Mallory decisions and urging con-
gressional action of a remedial nature.114 The testimony was supple-
mented by scores of letters and newspaper clippings blaming Su-
preme Court decisions for the rising crime rate. Statistics indicat-
ing an increasing occurrence of crime were stressed throughout the
hearings, while other statistical reports, such as the Younger
survey,115 were de-emphasized or dismissed as inaccurate.
The sentiment of the nation as a whole with regard to the
Supreme Court and the crime rate would seem to substantiate the
arguments of Senators and others who urged congressional modifi-
cation of Miranda and Mallory. Title II was inserted into the Omni-
bus Crime Bill at a time when the Gallup Poll showed that sixty-
three per cent of the public felt that courts were too lenient on
criminals, compared to forty-eight per cent who held that opinion
in 1958.116 The bill has been enacted in a year when the issue of
"law and order" was a key focal point of political campaigns, with
many candidates mentioning the Supreme Court as a factor related
to the increase of crime. It can only be concluded, therefore, that
Congress has responded to the public demand for more efficient law
enforcement by attempting to curb the Supreme Court and by modi-
fying some of its past decisions which it considers harmful.
The assumption that the Supreme Court is in some way respon-
sible for the increased incidence of crime, which is the policy basis
for Title II, seems to be a non-sequitur in the classic sense; yet, the
argument has great political efficacy. It is far easier to charge the
114 Among those testifying in support of Title II were Judge Alexander
Holtzoff (Id. at 259), and Justice Michael Musmanno (Id. at 572).
115 Hearings on S. 674, supra note 62, at 340-53. The Younger survey was
a statistical study made by Evelle J. Younger, the District Attorney
for the County of Los Angeles, subsequent to the Miranda decision.
The report showed that the Miranda decision had no substantial
effect on the number of convictions obtained in Los Angeles County
and was not an impediment on law enforcement.
116 N.Y. Times, April 28, 1968, § E, at 12.
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Court with permissiveness in the area of criminal justice than to
attempt to correlate crime with vital social issues such as poverty,
unemployment, race relations, and substandard education, or to
allocate funds for modern and efficient law enforcement. By avoid-
ing these factors and attacking the Court's decisions which allegedly
allow the confessed criminal to walk the streets, Congress has
created the impression that it is taking positive action to combat
crime, thereby placating the large segment of the population that
feels the rights of the accused criminal offender have been placed
paramount to the right of "law-abiding citizens" to be free from
violence. It is easy to see how such an approach will yield votes;
yet it is difficult to understand how it will arrest crime.
Given the premise that Congress felt the necessity of curbing
the Supreme Court in order to reduce the incidence of crime,
another question arises as to why the method of direct decision-
reversing legislation was chosen in preference to alternative re-
sponses such as limitation of jurisdiction or constitutional amend-
ment. The glaring constitutional questions which Title II presents
could have been avoided or at least softened by use of other means
of Court limitation, yet Congress chose to avoid the path of least
resistance and altered Miranda and Mallory through direct legis-
lation.
A plausible explanation of this question could be that Congress
deliberately enacted a bill which would inevitably reach the Su-
preme Court for constitutional adjudication in order to force the
Supreme Court to re-examine its holding in Miranda and possibly
reverse that decision. It is possible that this course was taken in
anticipation of personnel changes on the Court which might alter
the original five to four alignment of the Miranda Court.117 Cer-
tainly this theory would be substantiated by the current opposition
to Senate approval of the recent appointments to the Court, since
the appointees would probably vote to affirm Miranda. In his report
on Title II after its passage by the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Senator McClellan suggests that by the time Title II is tested in
the courts, the Supreme Court is likely to reverse its opinion in
Miranda and uphold the statute."18
117 Although Justice Clark, who voted with the dissent in Miranda, has
been replaced by Thurgood Marshall, who might vote to affirm the
Miranda decision, there is still the possibility that appointment of
one or more "anti-Miranda" Justices could influence the Court "in
reversing that decision. This would be especially true if public senti-
ment against Miranda rose to a sufficiently high level.
118 S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 58, at 51.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although Title II has met with a great amount of criticism,
especially from legal circles, it is suggested that the long-range
effects of the legislation will be beneficial. If the Supreme Court
determines that the legislative elimination of the Miranda require-
ments from the federal courts is unconstitutional, as anticipated by
this author, such a decision will conclusively establish the binding
effect of the Court's interpretation of the Constitution. Also, an
adjudication of the invalidity of Title II may provide an opportunity
for the Court to reaffirm the fact that basic civil liberties and pro-
cedural safeguards afforded to the criminal defendant are constitu-
tional requirements, not merely factors which can be balanced
against crime statistics and compromised at will.
Hopefully, the most significant effect of a determination of the
validity of Title II will be a limitation on the influence of political
elements on constitutional adjudication. It would appear likely that
by launching a frontal attack on the Court in the form of Title II,
certain elements of Congress that have been dissatisfied with recent
decisions in the civil rights area are now taking advantage of the
growing reaction to the crime problem in order to assert a limiting
power over the Court. Such action may seem justifiable to certain
segments of the population as a seemingly effective tool to cope
with a serious crime problem, but it can never be justifiable from
a constitutional standpoint. The framers of the Constitution recog-
nized that in order to give lasting and uniform interpretation of
that instrument, the interpreting body must be as free as possible
from political fluctuation. They realized also that the Court could
never be completely isolated from politics, and therefore they form-
ulated the various legitimate modes of Congressional response
analyzed earlier which minimized the possibility of the court being
subjected to regional or partisan pressure. Thus, the role of the
Supreme Court as the final interpreter of the Constitution is based
on the Court's traditionally independent status and its relative
freedom from political influence. This position is vital to the con-
cept of separation of powers, and it is hoped that it will be retained.
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